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In January 1975, a two-day symposium titled Conceptual 
Architecture was held at Art Net, a gallery and event space 
founded by Peter Cook in London.1 Its proceedings survive 
in the form of a series of videos, shot by Dennis Crompton 
and accessible—on account of the standard videotape format 
of the time—as a sequence of one-hour long episodes that are 
viewable on the website of the Architectural Association and 
also on the school’s YouTube channel.2 Seen through the 
optic of the videos the event unfolds within a putrid yellow-
ish-green miasma, its audience slouched in deck-chairs while 
listening to speakers who deliver their presentations from 
behind what looks unnervingly like a front-loading washing 
machine surrounded by tropical pot plants. Toward the close 
of the first session, proceedings are interrupted by the appear-
ance of three people in gorilla costumes, who wander around 
the room, growling. One of them begins to groom the hair of 
Charles Jencks, who is taking questions at the time. Oh it’s 
easy to protest, Peter Eisenman is heard to protest, when you 
are in disguise.
1   It operated between 1973 and 
1979. See ‘97. ART NET, NO. 
1, LONDON’, in Clip, Stamp, 
Fold: The Radical Architecture of 
Little Magazines, 196X to 197X, 
ed. Beatriz Colomina and Craig 
Buckley (Barcelona: ACTAR, 
2006), p. 139.
2   www.aaschool.ac.uk//
VIDEO/lecture.php?ID=2342 
etc. and www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rqCg1WLUMac etc. 
(both last accessed on 2 May 
2018).
Charles Jencks and gorilla, 
Conceptual Architecture sympo-
sium, Art Net. London. Day 1, 
17 January 1975. Courtesy of 
Architectural Association Photo 
Library.
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The symposium was chaired by Robert Maxwell, 
although I gather that it was Peter Cook who convened the 
event and invited the speakers. At the outset, in his introduc-
tory remarks, Maxwell makes clear that this is a symposium 
to do with thinking about the relations—or the possibility of 
a new kind of relation—between art and architecture. The 
explicit context for this—marked in the event’s title—was 
Conceptual Art, whose ‘organized onset’, as it has been 
described,3 had taken place seven years earlier, although its 
characteristic tendencies and preoccupations had been visible 
from at least the beginning of the 1960s—and before, from 
Duchamp. Reflecting this, the advertised list of speakers 
included the curator Roselee Goldberg and the artists John 
Stezaker and Victor Burgin, although the latter did not in the 
end attend. On the side of architecture, besides Jencks, Cook 
and Eisenman, there was Will Alsop, Cedric Price, Colin 
Rowe, Dalibor Vesely, Joseph Rykwert, and Bernard 
Tschumi. Watching the recordings, we at times see James 
Stirling in the audience, as well as the former compatriots 
from the Institute of Contemporary Art’s Independent 
Group, Richard Hamilton and Reyner Banham, to whom I 
will shortly return.
This 1975 happening was certainly not the first time that 
the idea of conceptual architecture had been explicitly 
addressed. Five years earlier, in 1970, the critic and curator 
John Margolies had, on the invitation of the Walker Art 
Center in Minneapolis, guest-edited a double-issue of Design 
Quarterly on the topic. Focusing on—as Margolies put it in 
his letter to contributors that was reproduced in edited form 
at the start of the issue—‘the communications environment; 
the psychological environment; the entertainment environ-
ment,’ the special issue included contributions from, amongst 
others, Ant Farm, Archizoom, François Dallegret, 
3   Hal Foster et al., Art Since 
1900: Modernism, 
Antimodernism, Postmodernism 
(London: Thames & Hudson, 
2004), p. 527.
Haus-Rucker-Company, and Ed Ruscha.4 It was opened by 
Eisenman’s ‘Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a 
Definition’, which consisted of four almost blank pages—
almost blank because they were patterned by constellations of 
footnote references, presumably positioned in relation to an 
invisible article that ran below them. As it was published, the 
only continuous and legible text was that of the footnotes 
themselves at the bottom of each page and Eisenman’s own 
biography at the end.
My aim here, then, is to use the 1975 symposium as a 
case study in order to test an argument about the relations 
between art and architecture, recognizing that this is a 
thought experiment which may appear overly speculative and 
schematic to many—perhaps most—readers. It begins with 
the bald generalization that architecture has characteristically 
described what it is—that is, what makes it architecture—
through an appeal to some idea of ‘art.’ This is not the only 
way that architecture has narrated how it comes to be itself, 
but it is an important one and persistent enough to remark 
upon. How would we historicize this? Evasively, I would say 
it occurs within the ‘modern period’, by which I mean from 
the eighteenth century onward—but it is difficult to draw 
very clear boundaries here. The idea is that architecture is 
building that surpasses building by virtue of the addition of 
art in some way. This has various expressions, such as archi-
tecture as ‘building with art’ or ‘the art of building’ (and these 
are not necessarily the same thing, although at times they 
might be). A perhaps overly-familiar example is Nikolaus 
Pevsner’s declaration at the beginning of his 1943 Outline of 
European Architecture that:
A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece 
of architecture. Nearly everything that encloses space on 
4   Front matter, Design 
Quarterly no. 78/79, Conceptual 
Architecture (1970).
20 21
Mark DorrianArt Architecture/Concept
a scale sufficient for a human being to move in is a build-
ing; the term architecture applies only to buildings 
designed with a view to aesthetic appeal.5
Here, it is the presence of art as it is actualized in the aes-
thetic status of the construction that makes architecture archi-
tecture. This is a longstanding and still current idea.
Consider, for example, Steven Holl’s short text from 
2013, ‘What is Architecture? (Art?)’. Organized under four 
headings—‘Abstract’, ‘Use’, ‘Space’, and ‘Idea’—the article 
constantly asserts, sometimes explicitly and sometimes by 
implication, the centrality and necessity of art to architecture 
while at the same time taking care to distance and differenti-
ate it. So, architecture has to deal with ‘constraints of engi-
neering safety, function, climate, responsibility, and econ-
omy’, yet these it ‘transcends to inspire us with ideas in space 
and light—qualities achieved in the abstract’. Architecture 
might be useful, but mere function is surpassed in what Holl 
calls ‘its highest “use”’, which is ‘to deeply move us’; again, 
‘Drawing us from one location to the next, architecture is the 
art of space’.6
This tension, which is compulsively played out in the 
various formulations of architecture’s self-definition via the 
appeal to art, suggests that art has played the role of a supple-
ment—in its Rousseau-esque/Derridean sense—to architec-
ture: that is, the understanding of the supplement as the 
external, alien, thing that is required to be added, in this case 
to architecture, in order to complete it and confer its full iden-
tity and meaning. The logic of the supplement is character-
ized by precisely this kind of tension—that between, on one 
hand, appeal and deferral, and on the other, refusal and disa-
vowal. And typically the latter has, at least since the eight-
eenth century, been enacted on the grounds of utility as the 
5   Nikolaus Pevsner, An Outline 
of European Architecture 
(London: Thames & Hudson, 
1948 [1943]), xix.
6   Steven Holl, ‘What is 
Architecture? (Art?)’, The 
Brooklyn Rail: Critical 
Perspectives on Arts, Politics, 
and Culture, 4 September 2013 
(https://brooklynrail.org/ 
2013/09/criticspage/what-is- 
architecture-art, last accessed 
on 2 May 2018).
basis for the differentiation of architecture from art. From the 
point of view of the theory of the supplement, the answer to 
the inside/outside question7 is therefore that the outside (art) 
is the inside (architecture), insofar as it is the foreign, non-
identical presence whose addition constitutes the identity of 
the thing that it is differentiated from.
Going on from this, what I want to suggest is that this 
relation begins to be restructured in the years prior to the 
Conceptual Architecture event, and that this has as much to 
do with transformations in discourses of art as it does with 
architecture — and moreover, that this maps on to, and 
indeed perhaps impels, what we have learned to call architec-
ture’s turn toward theory from the late 1960s on. On the side 
of art, the factors that seem important to emphasize because 
they are consequential to this shift include: Conceptual Art’s 
interrogation of the relations between art and language; its 
exploration of the institutional conditions of production and 
related exposure of the repressions necessary to secure claims 
of autonomy; and the dis-identification of the artwork with its 
material realization.
As one might expect, at the 1975 symposium there are 
various positions in evidence in relation to the notion of con-
ceptual architecture. The presentations fall broadly into two 
types—those concerned to assert that architecture has always 
been conceptual and that therefore what we might mean by 
conceptual architecture can be illustrated by historical exam-
ples; and those that argue that conceptual architecture, by 
implicit or explicit comparison with Conceptual Art, should 
mean something quite different from historical forms of archi-
tecture understood to be driven by concepts. What is striking 
about all this, in relation to what we have just observed, is 
that although—as Maxwell noted in his introduction—the 
symposium was concerned with the relations between art and 
7   The title of the symposium 
on which the current volume is 
based, and for which this paper 
was first prepared, was 
Inside|Outside: Trading Between 
Art and Architecture.
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architecture, art or the aesthetic are rarely explicitly men-
tioned or appealed to. Instead what happens in this discourse 
is that architecture now is understood to become deter-
mined—to become possible—to the extent that it has a con-
cept, and this in turn allows it to merge into art, the art of 
conceptualism, without declaring that it is doing so. In short, 
the reconfiguration of the practices of art and architecture 
under the impetus of the conceptual turn—with the fore-
grounding of the concept—makes them newly porous to one 
another and maybe even indistinguishable. In his presenta-
tion, John Stezaker went so far as to enumerate six ideas or 
concerns related to conceptual art and then illustrated how 
they could be worked through in architecture.
The new emphasis on the centrality of the concept to the 
definition of architecture is very clear in Bernard Tschumi’s 
presentation, which is developed around Étienne-Louis 
Boullée’s insistence that architecture is a product of the 
mind.8 What gives architecture its status is its ideational con-
tent, and this means that architecture can exist as much in the 
form of a drawing or text as in a physical construction. 
Indeed, returning to our architecture/building opposition, we 
could say that—from this point of view—what turns out to 
ultimately differentiate the two is the non-necessity of real-
izing architecture in constructed form. Compare this with a 
much later comment of Eisenman’s, from 2013, in which he is 
responding to a question about his early houses: ‘The “real 
architecture” only exists in the drawings. The “real building” 
exists outside the drawings. The difference here is that “archi-
tecture” and “building“ are not the same.’9 This, while shar-
ing the same logic, escalates it to the point where architecture 
is now understood to be negated by the act of building.
These considerations bring us to a situation in which it 
appears that art and architecture are at the point of collapsing 
8   As a caveat here, we need to 
acknowledge that some notion of 
the concept as being essential to 
architecture was not necessarily 
new. Thus the whole Platonic 
tradition, where architecture 
embodies a higher idea through 
its proportional relations—but 
this is metaphysical and aes-
thetic, in the sense that it is to 
do with beauty as the reflection 
of the divine in the sensible 
world and is obviously quite 
different from conceptual art’s 
‘concept’.
9   Iman Ansari, ‘Interview: 
Peter Eisenman’, The 
Architectural Review, 26 April 
2013 (www.architectural-review.
com/rethink/interview-peter-
eisenman/8646893.article, last 
accessed on 2 May 2018).
into one another. Art, post-conceptual art, is no longer in the 
position of a supplement as there is no longer any disavowal 
based on the criterion of utility, for this has been displaced by 
the new insistence on the conceptual basis of architecture. 
Utility is no longer what it was when architecture can be a 
drawing or a text. However, what is interesting is the way in 
which it comes to return. My claim here is that utility, which 
hitherto had been fully interior to architecture, shifts to take 
up the position of supplementarity that had previously been 
occupied by art, and that this comes to motivate contempo-
rary architectural discourse’s particular regard for pavilions, 
follies, and ruins, insofar as they are understood as construc-
tions of contingent, indeterminate or suspended use.
Let’s then briefly consider utility and look at how it was 
discussed at the 1975 symposium. Following Cedric Price’s 
talk, there was an interesting intervention from the floor by 
Reyner Banham that, it seems to me, illustrates the transfor-
mation we have just described. Banham recalls that the 
phrase ‘conceptual architecture’ was used in England in the 
mid-1950s by Jim Richards and Robert Furneaux Jordan to 
characterize work that they saw as putting ‘...  the expression 
and idea over and above, or as more important than, the ser-
vice to the expressed needs of the client, etc. etc. etc.’ 
Examples of this impulse he cites are the Smithsons’ school at 
Hunstanton in Norfolk and the early housing projects of 
Stirling and Gowan. Banham observes that much he has 
heard at the symposium repeats this, but that the polarity has 
changed. What was for Richards and Furneaux Jordan 
‘extremely naughty, naughty and suspect’ is now, 20 years 
later, ‘regarded as something of “potential value”’.10 And while 
it was clearly far from the case that utility had become a non-
determinant for all the speakers—Price himself being a case 
in point—watching the talks again, it does look like a kind of 
10   www.aaschool.ac.uk//
VIDEO/lecture.php?ID=2346, 
4:22–6:44.
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generational shift, with both Tschumi and Eisenman speak-
ing for an architecture released from service to functional 
concerns.
By the lights of the usual understandings, it becomes 
hard to tell architecture and art apart. But now, as I have 
already indicated, it is very striking how, as this discourse 
played out, use—which had been expelled—returned as sup-
plement in order to permit a secondary, perhaps weaker, dif-
ferentiation to take place between art and architecture. This 
is very evident in Eisenman’s work, because it was thematized 
in it, but it is also there in the red follies of Tschumi’s Parc de 
la Villette, objects whose accompanying rhetoric regarding 
the free play of form met a limit with their need to accommo-
date programme. In Eisenman’s case, by the time of the 1987 
essay ‘Misreading’ he had come to define architecture as ‘the 
investigation of new possibilities of occupiable form’.11 Here 
use, having been estranged, now re-entered as supplement in 
order to make possible and secure architecture. Certainly this 
was no longer function, if we mean by that culturally pre-
scribed or ideologically determined use (Eisenman had railed 
against functionalism as a late form of anthropocentrism in 
his well-known ‘Post-Functionalism’ editorial for 
Oppositions).12 Instead, the condition for use’s reappearance 
as a determinant for architecture was that it should be emp-
tied of all determinations—that is to say, defunctionalized—
in order to be posited as an open field of possibilities. And 
this, insofar as it was a way of maintaining or guaranteeing 
architecture at its point of disappearance, might be under-
stood as a conservative gesture. Robin Evans seems to say as 
much in his skeptical review of Eisenman’s exhibition held at 
the Architectural Association in Spring 1985, in which he 
noted a compulsive and strategic limitation of the effects of 
the processes and allusions that Eisenman repeatedly 
11   Peter Eisenman, 
‘Misreading’, in Houses of Card, 
Peter Eisenman et al. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), pp. 167–186, p. 167.
12   Peter Eisenman, ‘Post-
functionalism’ (1976), in 
Oppositions Reader: Selected 
Essays 1973–1984, ed. K. 
Michael Hays (New York: 
Princeton University Press, 
1998), pp. 9–12.
introduced into his architecture in order to ‘disrupt’ it. The 
verdict delivered by Evans was that ‘Eisenman is in fact a 
jealous guardian of the stable and fundamental features of 
architecture’.13 Comparing the mathematical understanding 
of the term ‘transformation’ with Eisenman’s enactment of it, 
Evans found only one example in the work that matched the 
total shifting of relations implied in the mathematical idea—
and this is in the unoccupiable transformation of House X, as 
depicted in the well-known pseudo-anamorphic model. 
Evans again: ‘If these foreign mathematical terms had been 
allowed to invade the work they would almost certainly have 
destroyed its quintessential architectural properties. They 
may just possibly have replaced them eventually...  their per-
manent corruption and obliteration. A dangerous business.’14
Ultimately, here, use-as-supplement—which is to say 
occupiability as distinct from functionality—turns out to be 
protective and prophylactic. Expelled from architecture, now 
‘outside’ it, use returns in order to produce a distancing effect 
that maintains and guarantees architecture by warding off the 
threat of its collapse, dissolution, disappearance, death. And 
this ultimately returns us in a striking way to Jacques 
Derrida’s theorization of the supplement, closely tied as it was 
to Rousseau’s confessions of onanism:
But one stroke must still be added to this system, to this 
strange economy of the supplement. In a certain way, it 
was already legible. A terrifying menace, the supplement 
is also the first and surest protection; against that very 
menace. This is why it cannot be given up.15
13   Robin Evans, ‘NOT TO BE 
USED FOR WRAPPING 
PURPOSES: Peter Eisenman: 
Fin D’Ou T Hou S’, AA Files 
no. 10 (1985), pp. 68–78, p. 70.
14   Evans, ‘NOT TO BE USED 
FOR WRAPPING 
PURPOSES...’, p. 70.
15   Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), p. 154.
